In this Journal last year, McKee, Lang and Roberts1 castigated the UK government for its handling of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy outbreak. At the root of the mismanagement, they declared, was the prevailing culture of deregulation; and they argued for a national Food Policy Council that might re-establish trust in the independence of advice given to ministers and the public. Another area of concern is biological product development, and even at this time of rapid innovation the UK National Institute for Biological Standards and Control could find itself a victim of the deregulatory culture. In this context, the stories of two air disasters are worth the retelling. THE 
RIOI
In the 1920s the future type of air travel was unclear. Although there had been great progress since the Wright brothers' first flight in a heavier-than-air machine, it was uncertain whether airships or airplanes would be the means for intercontinental travel. Alcock and Brown made the first transatlantic flight in an airplane in 1919, but the Germans had long since been operating the Zeppelins, which by 1923 were flying regularly to South America. In perished in the disaster. The Air Minister, a retired general, had taken the title of Lord Cardington (after the location of the Royal Airship Works) when he was asked to join the Cabinet. He was immensely keen on the enterprise, foreseeing a new era in Empire travel, and the project became entangled in personal ambition as well as national pride.
The main requirements for the two airships were five million cubic feet of hydrogen gas to give a gross life of 150 tons, with structure weight not more than 90 tons excluding fuel, to give a useful lift of 60 tons. They should have a top speed of 70 miles per hour (mph) and a cruising speed of 63 mph. They were to use fuel that would be safe in tropical and subtropical conditions, and to accommodate 100 passengers including space for eating and sleeping. The flight trial programme, according to Shute, involved a 48 h test flight, including 6 h at top speed in 'bumpy conditions', and an intercontinental flight to Canada for R100 and to India for R101. The fatal flaw in the arrangements was that the permits to fly and airworthiness certificates were issued by the Air Ministry on the advice of the Director of Airship Development at Cardington, where the R101 was made. They were thus an independent group for the R100 but were intimately involved with the R101 project. It was this lack of independence rather than civil servant status that was the problem.
The two airships were developed slowly because of their huge size. The first to fly was the R101, on 14 October 1929, but she proved dangerously short of lift, having only 35 tons of useful lift, mainly because she weighed 114 tons instead of 90. The excess was due to over-elaboration of equipment. R101 used heavy diesel engines (to meet the fuel requirements in tropical areas) instead of the conventional petrol ones in R100; it had a special engine for reversing whereas R100 used a reversing gear; and it had servo-assisted steering whereas the R100 was to be steered manually. To lighten the ship some of the R100 methods were adopted, and in addition the gasbags were enlarged to accommodate more gas. When all these measures proved inadequate, the ship was cut in two and a new gasbag bay was inserted, increasing the useful lift to 49.3 tons. But lift remained a serious problem, mainly because gas escaped through the novel valves when the ship rolled more than 50, and because the gasbags acquired holes where they chafed against the structure. These defects were
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Consultant in Vaccine Development, The Priest's House, Sissinghurst Castle, Cranbrook, Kent TN17 2AB, England so bad that the 48 h proving flight could not be completed, and finally the inspector in charge at the Air Ministry wrote on 3 July 1930 of his concern over the gas leaks: 'Until this matter is seriously taken in hand and remedied, I cannot recommend to you the extension of the present "permit to fly" or the issue of any further permit or certificate.' This message was sent to Wing Commander Colmore, who replied reassuringly about solving the problem by use of padding to avoid chafing: 'We have little doubt that padding will be a permanent remedy and, if this is accepted, then it is not a large undertaking to put the matter right.' The inspector pursued it no further.
Meanwhile the R100 was built. Although it had a useful lift of only 54 tons instead of 60, it completed its 48 h flight including 6 h at 70 mph in 'bumpy conditions'. Finally it triumphantly went to Canada and back, taking 78 h on the outward trip and 57.5 h on the wind-assisted return. The ship also survived a severe thunderstorm over Montreal. According to Nevil Shute, engineers at Cardington put out tentative feelers to the RI 00 team before the flight to Canada suggesting that both teams should delay intercontinental ffights until 1931, but without revealing their specific difficulties. The R100 team, confident of their craft's capabilities, decided to proceed. Had The R101 left Cardington at 6.30 pm on 4 October and arrived over Beauvais in France at 0200h on the following day. There it went into a steep dive, steadied briefly, and then hit the ground gently. Almost immediately she was engulfed in flames, killing 48 people on board; there were only six survivors. The inquiry concluded that the disaster was caused by a loss of lift due to a large rent in the most forward gasbag, which in its turn was due to a failure of the outer canopy.
The inspectors, supported by the experts at Cardington, worked much better for the R100. Nevil Shute valued the criticisms and corroboration of his calculations and the feasibility of the team's plans. He was scathing about the efficiency of the State Enterprise and the independence of civil servants, both being susceptible to political pressure. Private enterprise, he declared, has to position itself for success because failure is swiftly punished in a commercial setting. He believed that for a civil servant to maintain independence, private means were desirable if not imperative; but I believe that the principal cause of the disaster was the lack of an independent airworthiness authority rather than civil servant status. The official inquiry was not so scathing, praising the courage and ingenuity of the design team and the care they took in testing their airship. It Feynman' s view, NASA (National Aeronautical and Space Administration) had developed a flawed safety system. They had persuaded themselves, because of early success, that the probability of failure was 1/100000. They believed that 'the probability of mission success is necessarily very close to 1.0'. As Feynman tartly observes, does it mean it is 1.0 or that it should be? Indeed to state the proposition is to reveal its absurdity. NASA went on to observe, 'Historically, this extremely high degree of mission success has given rise to a difference in philosophy between unmanned flight programs and manned programs: i.e. numerical probability usage versus engineering judgement'. Feynman preferred numerical probability of all flights unmanned and manned, as he considered each of the components separately. He found many failures and near failures, especially of the 0 rings of the solid rocket boosters and the space shuttle main engines. Although he judged the checking system of the computers and software systems to be excellent with 'no process of gradually fooling oneself while degrading standards, the process so characteristic of the solid rocket booster and space shuttle main engine safety systems', he found the computer hardware obsolete; indeed NASA had had increasing difficulty in finding manufacturers to make such oldfashioned machines of the requisite quality. Feynman concluded 'The shuttle therefore flies in a relatively unsafe condition with a chance of failure of the order of a percent.' The errors would surely have been exposed if any system of independent and authoritative review of safety had been in operation before the tragedy. The last sentence in Feynman's report is 'For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature cannot be fooled.'
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS
In the UK, the need for an independent national control authority to oversee the safety and effectiveness of biological products was generally accepted until recently. Such an authority needs access to a laboratory capable of verifying the quality of the products and preferably able to conduct research related to product quality. The aim is to ensure safety and effectiveness, both during development and in routine manufacture. 
